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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CACHE \.TALLEY BANKING
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, as Executor of the Last
Will and Testainent of WII..._FORD F. BAl~GH, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
CACHE COlTNTY POULTRY
GROWER'S ---~SSOCIATION,
a corporation, an d U T A H
POULTRY & FARMERS COOPERATIVE, a corporation,
Defendants and Respondent.

Appellant's

Brief
Case No. 6860

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for the
County of Cache.

Hon.:
. arriner M. Morrison, Judge.
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
c.A.CriE \T ..-\.LI.J£\T BANKINctC<lJIPANY, a l~tah corporation, a~ Executor of the Last
Will and Testainent of WTI_.jL·'<)RJJ 'B._,. B..:\.l.GH, Deceased,
Pla,intiff and Appellant,

vs.

C..:\._CHE COlJNTY POULTRY
GROvVER'S ASSOCIATION,
a corporation, a n d U T A H
POULTRY & FARMERS COOPERATI,rE, a corporation,
Defendants and Respondent.

Appellant's
I

Brief
Case No. 6860

STATEl\iENT OF ISSUES
Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title to a part
of Block 5, J>lat "D" I.jogan City Survey, particularly

described in the contplaint, against the defendants. The
defendant l rtah T>oultry & Farmers Cooperative, by
way of counterclain1, asked to have the adjoining tract
of land to the South owned by it quieted in it, and in
addition clain1ed a right of "\vay for foot, vehicular and
anuual traffic. over a tract of land 16 1-2 feet wide,
l'B t Prillg on l\1 ain Street in ].logan City and extending
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West a distance of 175 feet. Its counterclaim sought to
claiin this road,vay, both as a public

road

and by

adverse use over a period of twenty-one years. The Court
found there was no dedication of the strip of land as a
public highway, but found in favor of the said defendant
on the issues of adverse use, and adjudged

the said

· defendant to have a right of way over the 16 1-2 feet
strip of land.

From this judgn1ent the plaintiff prose-

cutes this appeal.
STA'r~J~IENT

OF FACTS
About the year 1918 the Utah Idaho Central Railroad Company acquired a tract of land in Block 5 of
Plat "D" of Logan City Survey, having a frontage of
214 1-2 feet on :Niain Street and extending through the
block to First West· Street. They also acquired additional property to the South which they offered to sell
to the Cache Valley Commission Company at cost, and
invited the Cache \Talley Commission Company to build
its ·w·arehouse adjoining the railroad company as a
prospective major custon1er of the railroad. ( Tr. 212215).

Defendant's Exhibit "3" is a map showing the
location of the respective tracts of land and the tract
over which the right of way is clairned is marked "CC."
At the North appears the freighthouse of the U. I. C.
Railroad Cornpany, on the South of '\Vhich is the loading
and unloading platforn1s for custoi.ners, and on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Southea~t

a

~ntall

3
rectangular tract was used as a 8cale

house. Bet\YPen the

the

defendant·~

~ealP

house and the North line of

property, a width of 16 1-2 feet and

extending· \\,.. e~t 17j feet to the East line of defendant's
w. arehouse, is the tract in dispute. On the exhibit this is
marked ~ . C Disputed Right of Way C.'' Imn1ediately
south of the disputed right of way is a tract 16 1-2 feet
wide 1narked "• spur,' on the exhibit, and South of this
last tract is \Yhat is marked ''The Utah Poultry Warehouse,·' an open space between ''A'' and '' B,'' and a
further warehouse to the West marked "whse." On the
South of the l:tah Poultry is an alle~yway used by the
defendant for ingress and egress of its customers to the
platform entrance of its warehouse, and extending to the
south is tract '' E,'' a right of way acquired and used by
the defendant to reach Second South Street. (Tr 218)
Defendant's warehouse has a loading and unloading
platform on the South but none on the north. On the
North were two doors for loading and unloading cars
on the spur track. The main entrance was on the South.
(Tr 220)
The Cache Valley Commission Company accepted
the invitation of the railroad company, purchased the
tract now belonging to the defendant, built the ware-.
houses a hove set forth, ·( '"rr 213) and conveyed to the
railroad co1npany an ease1nent for a railroad track on
the North side of the building. (Tr 214-216) The railroad co1npany constructed the spur track so that cars
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

could be spotted at t'vo doors on the north side of defendant's building and loaded and unloaded at this
point.

rr,he~'

also constructed plank crossings at points

''A'' and '' B'' as shown on

''Exhibit

3''

for

the

convenience of the defendant's vehicles in crossing
the defendant's yards into the railroad's freight yards
to facilitate their freight business. (Tr 218-19) This
spur was "approxin1ately three feet north of the building, the rails being approximately five feet apart and
the ties being approxirnately eight feet long. The rails
protruded above the level of the ground but the ties
were approximately at the level of the ground. (Tr 194-5
207-8) All of the tract of land owned by the railroad
company, except that part occupied by buildings and
spur tracks, was used as a freight yard, and was used
by customers of the railroad cornpany in the coal business, lumber business, and other businesses. The tract
in dispute was graveled by the railroad company and
was used by its customers, including the customers of
the Commission Company, to go to the freight house to
load and unload freight, and was like,vise used by the
customers of the Cornmission Company and defendant to
reach the defendant's pren1ises for their business with
the defendant. There were no marks on the pren1ises
to indicate a traveled road ( Tr 141) or division line
between the plaintiff's and the defendant's tracts, and
none of the "\Vitnesses appeared to know where the
division line was ('l'~r 121-A, 151); but the plaintiff proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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duced a nu1uber of \vitiH:'~~e~ \vho testified to having
driven over the track to do business with the defendant.
About the y~ar 19-±:2, the Poultry l'to1npany acquired
the property of the l'aehe 'Talley Con11nission Company;
and in 1~l4 7 the 1T. I. C. Railroad Co1npany went out of
buint·s~ and the plaintiff'8 te~tate purchased the above
tract. ....\bstract8 of title were introduced, and both
parties established their respective record titles to the
tracts as described in the con1plaint. ( Tr 90, 131).
There was a boundary question involving one foot of
land brought out at the trial. This was no part of the
claimed right of "'~ay and was adjusted from th.e abstracts, and no further mention will be made as to this
one foot of land.
''Then ~fr. Baugh undertook to remove the freight
house and to' construct a building on the property purchased, the defendant asserted a right of way over the
disputed tract and this suit resulted. All of defendant's
\vitnesses testified that they drove over the tract at
their convenience an.d without being molested or interferred with by the plaintiff or his predecessors in interest. They testified that it 'vas customary to enter
from Main Street on the East on one side of the defendant's building, drive to the rear and around the building,
and out to the East on the other side. They could, at
any tiine, drive through the track marked '' E '' out to
Second South Street. Over plaintiff's objection they
were not perinitted hy the Court to testify whether the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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travel over the disputed tract was with permission of
the railroad company.
George Bowen, president of the Cache 'lalley
Commission Company during all of the time from 1918
to 1942 when it sold to defendant (rrr 212), testified that
the relationship between the railroad company and the
Cache Valley Comn1ission Company was a friendly
relationship; that the Cache Valley Commission was a
large customer of the railroad; that the use by the
Cache Valley Commission Company of the tract was not
with any intention of acquiring a right of way by
prescription; that at times cars were spotted on the
tracks for days at a time in such manner that the travel
was blocked by the two tracks (Tr 220); that the Cache
Valley Commission Cornpany first erected the large
front building and after World War I they erected the
rear building marked '' whse'' ; that the two were constructed on a line so as to permit a third section between
and make it one building in a straight line clear through
(Tr 217); that the Cache Valley Commission Company
had a contract with the coal company to use their scales
for weighing loads (Tr 219); and that vehicles might
enter on the south and turn around and go back out the
same way. (~rr 221) Nir. Bowen testified:

'' Q Cache V alle~,r Cornn1ission Companydid use the area C 'Yhich is marked 'disputed
right-of-way'~

..._t\.

-Yes, sir.
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\Yhy did you use itt

~-\

\Yell, \Yt\ felt free to use any of that area
in there clear over as far as the railroad platfornl. In fact \Ye were even carrying shipments
of freight fron1 their pla tfor1n over to our north
\\~arehouse door back and forth, and we had connections back and forth all the time.

Q ---:\nd those connections were

of mutual
benefit to your business as well as the U. I. C. 1
A Yes, sir.

Q When you used it did you ever do so with
the intention of acquiring a right-of-way by pre~
scriptive easement~
A No sir.
:ThJR. YOUNG: I object to that as incompetent, irrevelant, and immaterial. Has no
authority shown by this witness to bind the corporation.''

ASSIGNl\fENT OF ERRORS
1. The Court erred in Inaking its Finding of Fact
number five and the whole thereof.
2. The Court erred in making that part of Finding
of Fact number five finding as a fact that the use by
the defendant of the disputed tract was adverse.
3. rPhE Court erred in making that part of Finding
of Fact number five finding as a fact that the adverse
use was with the knowledge of the o'\\rner of the property.
4. rrhe Court erred in Illaking that part of Finding
of .Fact nu1nher five that the defendant used the tract
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for foot and anintal traffic.
5. The Court erred in failing to find from the undisputed evidence that any use of the prentises by defendant or its customers was a per1nissive use.
6. The Court erred in failing to rind from the undisputed evidence that any use of the premises by
defendant and its predecessors and customers was
wholly without any notice

to the

plaintiff and its

predecessors that the same was under clairn of right or
by way of adverse use.
7. The Court erred in Inaking Conclusion of Law
number three and the whole thereof.
8. The Court erred in :q1aking Conclusion of

La\\~

number four and the whole thereof.
9. The Court erred in making Conclusion of Law
number six and the whole thereof.

10. The Court erred in entering that portion of its
judgment and decree contained in paragraph three of
the decree that defendant is the owner of an easement over the tract described in the said decree for foot,
vehicular and animal traffic, or at all.
11. The Court erred in entering that part of its
judgment and decree in paragraph four enjoining the
plaintiff and the persons clain1ing through Wilford F.
Baugh frorn interferring with the said easernent.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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12. The Court erred in failing and refusing to enter
judg1uent in fa,·or of the plaintiff and against the de;.
fendant <.tuieting plaintiff"s title to the entire tract de~cribed in paragraph one of the decree.
'1~he

Court erred in sustaining the defendant's
objection to the question asked the witness John Neiderhauser on cross-exa1uination, by plaintiff's counsel, as
13.

follo"~s:

· ~ Q . A. nd so far as you know when you used it
and other people used it, it was used with permission of the railroad con1pany to facilitate
their freight business~
:JlR. YOUKG: I object to that as calling for a
conclusion of the witness
THE COURT: Sustained." (Tr 119)
14. The Court erred in sustaining the defendant's
objection to the question asked the witness H W. Bal:~i lard, on cross-exan1ination, by pl,aintiff's counsel, as
follows:

'' Q A.ll right, plank crossings over their own
railroad for exit, ingress, and egress on the
property of your company-I'm talking about
this cornpany-so that your custo1ners could cross
oveT into the railroad property, don't you think
that any travel in the area C was by permission of
the railroad~
~IR.

CI_jAvVSON: J"ust a Ininute. we object
to that as calling for the conclusion'rHE COliRT: "Sustained." (11 r 160-61)
15. rrhe (iourt erred in sustaining the defendant's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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objection to the question asked the witness I.Jewis Bowen,
on Cross-exainination, by plaintiff's counsel, as follows:

'' Q And if they went further over to the
other property, so far as you knew they were
travelling with the consent of the railroad company~

MR. YOUNG: 1 object to that as calling for
a conclusion.
THE COURT: ''Sustained.'' (Tr 188)
ARGUMENT
Appellant contends that the evidence in this case
wholly fails to sustain either the Findings of Fact that the
use of the tract in question was adverse or under claim
of right or that plaintiff had any knowledge of such adverse use or claim of right; that the Findings of Fact do
not find sufficient facts to sustain the Conclusions of
Law that defendant was and is the owner of an easeInent described in the Judgment; and that the Judgment
awarding such easement is contrary to law. The
Assignments of Error numbers one to twelve inclusive
cover the propositions above mentioned and, therefore,
may be discussed together.
I
BURDEN OF PROOF
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE 1JSE OF
THE TRACT IN QtTESTION WAS A_DVERSE OR
UNDER CLAIM OF RIGHT OR THAT PLAINTIFF
HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF STJCH FACTS.
Since there appears to be no in1portant or substantial conflict in the testirnony, no useful purpose
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by analyzing the testimony

of

each

\ritness, but in general the evidence shows that the defendant produeed

a~ \vitne~ses

tvvo for1ner e1nployees of

the Cache \Talley Counnission l~oinpan,v-J ohn Neiderhau8er and Le,vis Bo,ven-and a nu1nber of its members
as \Yitnesses in the case. All of these witnesses, including the two en1ployees, testified in substance that on
nun1erous occasions \vhen they went to the defendant's
place of business as custo1ners they, at times, 'drove
around the defendant's building and either went in or
out over a portion of the disputed tract. Most of these
·witnesses testified that the tract between the U. I. C.
freighthouse and the defendant's building looked like a
roadway, but on cross-exa1nination each one of them
also stated that it looked like a freight yard. There is no
dispute in the evidence but that the main entrance to the
defendant's place of business was on the South of their
_:building, that the railroad's freighthouse had its main
delivery platfor1n on the South side, and that all local
freight was called for and delivered to railroad customer~ on the South side of their freighthouse, and that they
used this freig·ht ~vard as the means of ingress and
egress to the freighthouse.
Likewise, it is undisputed in the evidence tha~ there
w-as nothing on the prernises to 1nark the division line
between the two properties, and none of the witnesses
kne'\\r where the division line was. Neither did the
witnesses know whether they were on the railroad
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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property or <)n the property of the Cache \Talley Comnlission Company. The "ritnesses usually stated they
traveled along adjoining the tracks north of the defendant's building. (Tr 146-7).
There is not one word of evidence in

the record

that anybody ever traveled over the disputed tract on
foot or drove animals over the sarne but (apparently
for good rneasure) the Court in its Judgment awarded
an easement ''for foot, vehicular and animal traffic.''
Likewise, the testimony of George Bowen, a witness
for the plaintiff, who was the manager of the Cache
'Talley Comrnission Company, was undisputed: (Tr 212228).

(a) That the Cache \;--alley Commission Company
purchased its property frorn the railroad company and
built its warehouse at the request of the railroad company; that they weighed on the railroad or coal company scales by arrangements with the company; and
that all their relationships were friendly and in an effort
to jointly build up their respective businesses.
(b) That it was the plan of the company~ to build a
warehouse between the t\vo buildings, which would
effectively destroy any clain1ed use of this right of way.
(e) ']~hat it was possible to turn around and go out
on the South ~ide of the Cache \~alley Connnission Coinpany building, and likewise the l 1ache \Talley Con1misSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sion (\nnpany aequired a Right of Way fron1 the South
~idP

of their propPrty to 2nd South St.

and

traffic

could go in on th~ South side of the Cache Valley Cornlni::;sion {_~on1pany building (their principal loading and
unloading plarP of business) and drjve thence South on
2nd South St.
(d) That they never used any part of the claimed
Righ of ''"'" ay 'vith intent to claim the Right of Way; this
testin1ony being undisputed and this witness being the
principal 'vitness knowing about these matters we must
then establish conclusively that until 1941 at least the
use was pern1issive and that there was no adverse use of
the claimed Right of Way.

:;jj

In other words, the only showing made by the defendant's witnesses was an actual use of portions of the
disputed tract for ingress and egress to the defendant's
premises. There is no evidence \vhatever that this use
was adverse or under claim of right or was not per~
missive and the only positive evidence is that the use was
permissive and not adverse; and there is no evidence one
\vay or the other that the railroad cornpany had any
knowledge that the persons who used the right of way
were not crossing over the tract as customers of the
railroad Co1npany rather than as customers of the Commission company.

II
E'INDINGS OF FACT DO NOT FIND FACTS
lTPON
WI-JICH, lTNDER L . .\ W OF THIS STATE, A
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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JlTDGM~JNre

OF, ADVJ1JRSE USE CAN BE SUS-

TAINED.
It should be re1nernbered that this property is owned
and used by a public utility and presents an entirely
different set of circumstances than the ordinary case
of an easernent by prescription. It is not to be presumed that the railroad cornpany, a public utility under
duty to serve every mernber of the public without discrimination or without selecting its customers, could
"ride herd" on all persons using its freig_ht yards and
premises to inquire whether or not they were customers
or prospective customers of the railroad or of·- some of
the railroad's neighbor customers, or whether or not
they were on the premises under some claim of right
adverse to the railroad company; and this is particularly
true where the Cache Valley Commission Company was
one of the principal customers of the railroad company
and had been invited to build near the railroad company
for convenience in shipping its freight.
One of the first early Utah cases

discussing the

subject of easement by prescription was the case of
Harkness vs. Woodmansee, 7 U t. 227, 26 Pac 291:
' 'Where a person opens a way for the use of
hi8 own premises, and another person uses it also
without causing damage, the presumption is, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that such
use by the latter was permissive, and not under a
claim of right.''
The case of Jensen vs. -Gerrard, 85 lT tah 481, 39 P.
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~d 1070~ i~

another on tht.• n1atter of Burden of Proof,

and points out that adverse use can not be sustained
\vhen it re::5ts upon a license or 1nere neighborly or business accomodation.
In the case of Bertolina vs. Frates, 57 Pac 2d 346, at
page 348, the court Inakes the following staten1ents:
''There is a mass of evidence in the record
tending to establish that numerous people besides
the defendants have traveled as occasion required
over the alleged Right of Way, but that evidencP
is immaterial in this case. Where a person
claims to have acquired an easement by prescription over another's land, he must show that h~
has acquired it by his own continuous, open, un~
interrupted and adverse user under claim of
right for the twenty-year prescriptive period.
The prescriptive right is based originally upon
the theory of a grant implied from long use. Funk
v. Anderson, 22 Utah 238, 61 P. 1006. It runs to
the individual and not to the public. Mr. Washborn, in his work on Easements (4th Ed.) 43, P.
164, says: ''But one can not claim a right of way
as a private one by showing that it had been used
by the proprietors of other lots than his own. He
must show a user by himself or his predecessors
of the way to his o\vn lot under a claim of right
for the requisite period of time, continuously, by
the acquiescence of the owner of the land over
which it lies."
''A user by an individual which is not distinguished from that of the public will be con~idered permissive and not adverse unless there
is evidence that it was under a claim of right in
hirnself and that the owner knou1ing of such claim
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acquiesced ilfi ,it. Authorities should be unneces~ax~' to denton~trate that principle.
The 1nere
state1nent of the conditions under which the prescriptive right rnay be acquired negatives the
idea of the user of others either adding to or
detracting fro1n the rights of a particular
clain1ant. ''

All of the above cases are strongest in favor of the
defendant because the land clain1ed in each case apparently had no other use than the use of a road to go from
one place to another, while the land now sought to be
claimed was a part of a larger freight yard and there
was nothing to mark its boundaries, and there is now no
evidence to mark the boundary or to sustain a boundary
line of the claimed easement.
"Where an easeinent is acquired by prescription the extent of the right is fixed by and determined by the user in 'vhich it originated • • •
an easement acquired by prescription can not be
extended except by an. adverse user which has
been acquiesced in for the requisite length of time
* * * " 2s c.J·.s. 751.
In the case of Bolton vs. ~furphy, 41 Utah
591, 127 Pac 335 this Court says :
' 'Appellants are li1ni ted to the use they made
of the same (rl.ght of way) the lasat 20 years~
that is, the 20 years innnediately preceding the
thne of the objection to the use thereof by respondents. The nature or character of the use of an
easement rna)! be changed, PROVIDED THE
CH.A.NGJ~J C~ONTINlT.BJS T_j()NO· EN01TGH TO
GI'll~J

A

PRJ~SCRIP~ri\FE

RIGHT."
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If undPr

th~

evidence in this case the defendants cau

prevail for a prescriptive right over 16 1-2 feet of the
plaintiff·s property, it would seen1 that there is no limit
to the an1ount that they Inight claim, with the exceptions
of w·here buildings '\vere located. The testimony
sho,Yed that they on occasions used the scale house and
on other occasions used and drove through the scale
house and drove around through the coal yards, and
there is no distinction bet\veen any of the evidence indicating that one 'vas any n1ore under claiin of right than
the other, and it is not the law that business property
used by the owner and its customers as such must be
subjected to private easements anywhere customers of
the business concern may have driven, under such
flimsy evidence positively denied by the witness, Bowen,
as we have in this case. To permit the defendant to
prevail on the claimed prescriptive theory in this case
would be equivalent to holding that every railroad yard
or public utility yard in the State of Utah could not be
changed, nor could buildings be erected thereon by the
utility if their customers had happened to drive over
this yard or n1ake use of the yard in their business for 20
years.
III
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE BRING THE CASE
WITH THE CAS~jS BEGINNING WITH HARKNESS \rS 'VOOD~1ANSEE AND ENDING WITH
SAV.A.G-J1J VS NIFjl.4SEN, NOT WITHIN THE DOCTRINE O:B~ ZOIJLINGER 'TS FRANK.
The facts in the cases of Zollinger vs. Frank, 175
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
Pac 2nd, 714, referred to in the later case of Dahnken vs.
George Rontney and Sons Contpany 184 P. 2d 211, are
clear}~·

distinguished fron1 the case at bar, and there-

fore the rules announced therein have no application
here. The facts in both those cases brought them within
the rule that where the use of the RIGHT OF WAY
is so well established for the prescriptive period that a
fair assumption can be n1ade that it was under a clain1
of right (or against the o"\\rner) the burden shifts· to the
owner to show that the use 'vas per1nissive. We have
no fault to find with this rule in a proper case. In the
Zollinger case the right of way was fenced, and used only
for road purposes and a ditch; the owner used only a.
part of the road while the claimant used it all and used
it more than the owner and made repairs on it at the
request of the owner.
In the Dahnken vs. Ron1ney case the narrow strip,
apparently about 10 feet wide, over which the easement
., was granted was the only 1neans of access to the rear of
,
· · the buildings on the do1ninant estate, so that the case
discusses quite at length the n1atter of way of necessity.
It was used for that purpose for forty years and there
was no question in the case about the owner of the
servient estate not being able to determine that such
us~ was being Inade by people not the custon1ers of
such owner; and no question of a public utility is involved in that case.

:.
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Thert~

are no sneh facts in this case. The property

was not u~ed a~ a road,vay but as a freight yard., there
was no fence 1narking its boundaries as a roadway, the
Railroad could have no \Yay to deter1nine whether per~ons using it "~ere custo1ners of the Railroad or of the
Cache \ 7 alley Connnission Co1npany. The railroad was
intere~ted in getting as n1uch custom from the Comntission Con1pany and its patrons as possible. It wanted
them to use its freight yard to bring freight business
to it. It "~as likewise interested in both present and
prospective custo1ners. It would have taken a whole
eorps of detectives and office hands to keep track of
every person entering its freight yards to inquire and
keep record whether they were there on business with
the Railroad or 'vith the Commission Company. No case
has been cited or found that it is a duty of a public
utility to accost every person making use of its freight
yard to determine the nature of their visit and just
where they were going or why or under what claim they
are entering over one portion of the freight yards instead of another. Such a rule would tend to destroy all
railroad freight business. Nor has any case been found
or cited that held the use of a roalroad freight yard is
not permissive.
If the use of this freight yard is not presumed to be
permissive to every member of the public who is a bonafide eustorner or a prospective customer (and all members of the public are prospective customers of a railSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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road) then the railroad is obliged (under penalty of
being deprived of the right to change the n1anner of the .
use of their property) to post notice

that only cus-

tomers and prospective custoiners are per1nitted to
enter their freight yard and to ernploy enough people
to police the san1e to ascertain that those making use of
the yard did not co1ne within this category. but . were
sirnply mernbers of the public using the same to get to
their destination; and that destination was not on the
railroad Cou1pany 's pre1nises. This burden upon any
railroad or public service coinpany· or other business
concern doing business \\'ith large proportions of the
public would be unworkable, unjust and unconstitutional
as taking property without due process of law. .All
these Inatters and rules clearly distinguish this case
from the rule in the Zollinger case.
It was not the -intention of the Supreme Court in
the Zollinger case to adopt a rule that every crossing by
one person of the property of anqther (much less the
property of a public utility eorporation provided by
the Railroad for the use of its customers) is presumed to
be adverse and under claim of right any 1nore than a
crossing by one n1e1nber of a fa1nily of property of
another rne1nber of the family is presumed to be adverse. ·Any such rule would require every utility to
post signs that no one but custo1ners of the Railroad
were to be admitted and then to police their yards
provided for the public to see that all users ,vere therP
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for prt\~ent business \vith the Railroad. No 8Uch facts
appear in the Zollinger or Dahnken cases. There
is nothing in either of these cases that would indicate
that the users of a Right of Way by the claimants ever
had any business or other relations of any kind with the
o'\vners so that the assumption could fairly be made that
the owners knew each use was for the benefit of the
clain1ant and 'vas not a customer of the owner.
In both the Zollinger and Dahnken cases the tracts
of land in dispute 'vere apparently used for no other
purpose than as a right of way and each case contained
a discussion that the contested strip might have been
a way _of necessity for the dominant estate. In the case
at bar it should be remembered that the defendant
owns and now uses as a right of way 16 1-2 feet north
of their building. No attempt was made to show this to
be inadequate. The mere use by driving over portions
of the freight yard under the peculiar circumstances
in this case without one word of positive evidence of
any intention by anybody at the time of such use to
acquire a right of way by adverse use is not enough to
create such right. To permit them now to move over
and claim a right of way over 16 1-2 feet of this freight
yard without any offer of compensation to the owner is
an injustice that should shock the good conscience of any
court.
This court in the last case on this subject, Savage
vs Nielsen 197 P. 2d 117 recognized the rule that not
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every use ol' a clain1ed easernent 1s presurned to be
adverse. 1~here the U8e was held to be by permissive
and the court said that:
'"It is apparent frorn this testirnony that the
use began as perinisHive· use and was used in
acknowledgrnent of a ~uperior right and title first
in the father, Albert Savage, and later in the .
brother, Gordon Savage. In 8hort, then, the facts
have put this case within the rule set out in J ensen v. Gerrard, supra, where it was said (85 Utah
481, 39 P. 2d 107-3) ;

''A twenty-yeat· use alone of a way is not
suff-icient to establish an easement. Mere use of
a roadway opened by a landowner for his own
purposes will be presumed permissive. An antagonistic or adverse use of a way cannot spring
fron~ a permissive use. A prescriptive title must
be acquired adversely. It cannot be adverse when
it rests upon a license or mere neighborly accomnlodation. Adverse user is the antithesis of permissive user. If the use is accompanied by any
recognition in express terms or by implication of
a right in the lando\vner to stop such use now or
at some tirne in the future, the use is not adverse.''
See also: Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48
Utah 142, 158 P. 684.
There can be no doubt that the use by the Commission Con1pany began as a· custo1ner of the Railroad
and was by permission in the beginning There is absolutely nothing in the record to show any fact called to
the attention of the Railroad that an~'"one was using their
freight yards under any clain1 that it -vvas a road or that
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they 'vere using it adverse})·.

rrhe facts then bring this case \Vithin the rule announced in the case of Savage vs. Nielsen (supra) and
the
ea~e

t~ases

cited therein, and not within

the

Zollinger

above. Neither did the Zollinger case overrule the

case~

beginning \vith Harkness vs. Woodmansee and
ending with the case of Savage vs. Nielsen above.
If the court should feel that the burden in this case
did shift to the plaintiff in this case then the undisputed
testimony of the witness, Bowen, fully settled that
burden, for the substance of his testimony was that the
b,~o companies were friendly working to build up their
respective businesses together, and that the Commission
Company was one of the Railroad's largest shippers,
and that whatever use they made was a permissive use
and \\'"as without any intent to claim an adverse use of
any of the property in the Railroad freight yards.
The clailn of prescriptive right of way must fail
because the evidence clearly establishes :
That the disputed property was not a right
of way, but a freight yard.
That there was no use of any right of way
by the defendant and its predecessor in interest
that was not entirely consistent with its use as a
freight yard.
That there was no evidence that the use was
uninterrupted. The undisputed evidence was
that it was at times interrupted for days at a time
hy freight cars.
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There is no evidence that the use was adverse. It was clearly the use of an invitee of
property opened by a public utility for a freight
yard for the u~e of its custou1ers and it is presunled permissive.
'l1here is no evidence thaf a use beginning
as perrnissive was ever transferred into an adverse use under claiin of right.

There is no evidence that the railroad ever
had knowledge of any facts that would put it
on notice that any use was inconsistent with
the purpose for which it was provided, to-wit,
as a freight yard customer, or under any claim
of right.
· ,.j
.

~

IV
REFUSAI_j OF E\TIDENCE ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION
Assignments of error 13, 14, and 15 all go to the
question of the ruling of the court sustaining defendant's objection to questions put to their witnesses on
cross-exan1ination, viz:
(13) And so far as you know, when you used
it and other people used it, it was with the per-

nlission of the Railroad Con1pany to facilitate
their freight business~ ( Tr 119)
(14) Don't, you think that any travel in the
area '' C '' was by perrnission of the Railroad 6?

(Tr 161)
(15) So far as you kne'v they were travelSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ling \Yith the
(Tr 188)

eon~ent

of the Railroad Con1pany1

The objection in each case \Vas that the question
called for the conclusion of
sustained by the court.

the

'vitness

and

was

With the possible exception of question 14 it is submitted that the questions do not call for a conclusion of
the witnesses, but "rere merely put to test his knowledge
or to inquire into the status of his knowledge about the
subject he had testified to. Each witness had testified
about the travel over the tract and the question as to
his knowledge as to how this travel was arranged, was
clearly proper cross-examination.
But it is further contended that the questions were
proper cross examination, irrespective of whether or
not they called for the opinion or conclusion of the
witness.
The general rule is that cross examination should
be permitted a wide latitude.
"In accordance with the rule permitting a
wide latitude in the cross-examination of a witness, the trial court in the exercise of its discretion as to the scope and extent of cross-examina~
tion should endeavor to extend, rather t~an restrict, such latitude~ and accordingly the right
to cross-exan1ination should not be lightly curtailed, nor the cross-examination be unduly restrjcted or limited and any undue restriction or
limitation on the seope and extent of the crossexamination is error." (70 C.J-., page 621.)
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''--·as a general ruh~, any 1natter is a proper
subject of cro~H-exarnination \vhich is responsive
to testilnony given on direct exarnination, and
which tends to elucidate, Inodify, explain, contrauict, or rebut testirnony given in chief by the witness, or which tends to elucidate, qualify, or rebut
any logical inference resulting fro1n such testirnony that tends to support in any degree the
opposite side of the case; and it has been held
that anything within the witness' knowledge tending to rebut the evidence on direct exarnination is
admissable as a rnatter of right on cross-examination." (70 C. J·., page 623-5)
''Where facts from \-vhich an inference unfavorable to the party is drawn are elicited fron1
a witness, everything within the knowledge of
the witness_ tending to rebut such an inference is
admissible on cross-exarnination, even if collateral; and, where a statement testified to in chief
admits of two inferences, it is the proper function
of cross-exan1ination to eliminate the inference
which is unfavorable to the party against whom
the witness testified." (70 C. J., page 638.)
In each case the witness, under cross-exarnination.
testified to travelling over the disputed tract. While
none of them testified that they travelled over the tract
with a claim of right or adversely that was the inference
contended for and only purpose the defendant could have
in putting thern on the stand. It is our contention, therefore, that their testimony \Vas susceptible of the infer~nce that either the travel -vvas by consent or under claim
of right. It is difficult to eonceive of 1nore appropriate
cioss-exarnination than to inquire if the unfavorable
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.ltfertJnt~

\YH8 not the propPr inference according to the

hest kno\Yledge of the witness. Additional question~

n1ight haYe been asked a8 to the source of his knowledge
if the (1ue8tion had been ans\vered in the negative.

In the case of Cahoon vs. vVest, 20 lTtah 73, 57 Pac.

715, the witness testified that he was the person who
n1ade a Bill of Sale in evidence. On cross examination
the court sustained objection to questions concerning the
property mentioned in the Bill of Sale. Held this was
reversable error :
Quoting from Wharton on Evidence the court said:
'• A witness may be cross-examined as to his
examination in chief as to all its bearings * * • On
cross-examination counsel should be allowed a
free range within the subject matter of the direct
examination and a wide latitude should be given
to a party who has to prove a negative * * • The
cross exan1ination of a witness should not be confined strictly to the precise subjects called to his
attention upon his direct examination, but should
be allowed to extend to any matter, not foreign to
the subject matter pf such examination tending to
limit, explain or modify."
In the case of Rasmussen vs. Sevier Valley Canal
Company, 40 lTtah 371, 121 Pac. 741, the witness testified
that he made a certain book entry and the issue was as
to his authority to make the san1e. On cross-examination the court sustained an objection to the question,
HYou Ina~' state how you ca1ne to n1ake the entry~"
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In holding this ruling to he error the eourt says at
page 745:
"Counsel for respondent, however, seeks to
~ustain the ruling of the court upon the ground
that the question was not proper cross-examination. In this eontention, \Ve think counsel is in
error. It had been shown that the witness made
the entry in the book and when he rnade it. We
think, in view of this, re:::;pondent had opened up
the subject so as to perrnit appellant's counsel to
inquire eoncerning the cj reu1nstances under which
the entry WAS MAD:Bj AND BY \TIRTUE OF
WHAT ~-\.UTHORITY, IF ANY, THE WITNESS ACTFJD. .;:-'\t least a part of the inquiry
which was directed to the witness by respondent's
counsel had son1e relation to the authority under
which he made the entry. If such was not the
purpose of the inquiry, it had none.''
It is true the word conclusion 'vas not rnentioned in
the opinion, but it is contended that if there was a
conclusion involved at all, it is the kind of conclusion that
must be proper if the rules for liberal cross-examination are to be sustained. It would seem that the same
rule that prevents a person frorn proving his case by
asking a witness for his conclusions, does not have the
same application "\\rhere the question is asked on crossexamination. Cross-exarnination often calls for admissions that n1ight be entirely irnproper on direct exarnination.
It is respectfully subrnitted that the rulings in
these three instances deprived the plaintiff of substan·
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tial

right~

of cro8s exa1nination, and were reversiblP

~rror.

In vie,\· of the fact that there are no 1naterial
dispute~ in the testi1nony, no useful purpose could be
~erved by a re-trial of this 1natter; and it is, therefore,
re~pectfully sulnnitted that the case should be reversed
and the Trial Court directed to enter its judgment
quieting the title in the plaintiff of its property described in the co1nplaint, free frou1 any clain1ed easement
by the defendant

PRESTON & HARRIS,
---~ttorneys

for Plaintiff and Appellant.
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